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TAXATION - THE AMOUNT REALIZED ON THE SALE OF PROPERTY
ENCUMBERED BY A NONRECOURSE MORTGAGE MUST INCLUDE THE
FULL BALANCE OF THE MORTGAGE EVEN THOUGH THE FAIR
MARKET VALUE OF THE PROPERTY Is LESS THAN THE MORTGAGE
BALANCE
In August of 1970 Clark, Incorporated and Clark Pelt formed
a general partnership for the purpose of constructing an apartment
complex in Duncanville, Texas.' Six days later the partnership
borrowed $1,851,500 on a nonrecourse 2 basis from Farm & Home
Savings Association. 3 Subsequently, John F. Tufts and three others
were admitted as general partners into the partnership. 4 The
apartment complex was completed in 197 1.- Each partner claimed
his share of depreciation and ordinary partnership losses as income
tax deductions in 1971 and 1972. 6 The deductions, totaling
$439,972, subtracted from the partnership's basis in the property,
$1,851,500, resulted in an adjusted basis of$1,455,740.1
On August 28, 1972, Fred Bayles, a third party, bought each
partner's interest in the partnership. 8 Although the fair market
value of the partnership property was less than $1,400,000, Bayles
assumed the nonrecourse mortgage of $1,851,500 as consideration
for the property. 9 The partners treated the fair market value of
the property at the time of the sale as the amount realized from the
sale. 10 The partnership's adjusted basis, $1,455,740, was deducted
1. Commissioner v. Tufts, 103 S.Ct. 1826, 1828 (1983).
2. Id. at 1828. A nonrecourse mortgage is a mortgage in which the borrower is not personally
liable; seizure of the property securing the mortgage is the lender's only recourse upon default. Note,
Federal Income Tax Treatment of Nonrecourse Debt, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1498 (1982).
3. 103 S.Ct. at 1828.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 1829.
7. Id. The basis of property is its cost. I.R.C. 5 1012 (West 1983). The adjusted basis of
propperty is its basis adjusted for exptenditures. rece ipts, losses, depreciation dtduciions. and other
tens that are chargeable to the capital at(ounis. I.R.C, § 1016 (West 1983).
8. 103 S.Ct. at 1829.
9. Id.
10. Id. Section 1001(b) of the Internal Revenue Code states that the amount realized from the
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from the amount realized resulting in a $55,740 partnership loss.11
The loss was reported on the partners' federal income tax returns
for the year of the sale.12
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Commissioner)
contended that the amount realized was the unpaid balance of the
nonrecourse mortgage, $1,851,500, rather than the fair market
value of the property sold.1 3 Proceeding on this contention, The
Commissioner determined that the sale resulted in a capital gain of
approximately $400,000.14
The Tax Court held that the full balance of the nonrecourse
mortgage was includable in the amount realized.15 The Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and ruled that the amount
realized need only include the nonrecourse mortgage up to the fair
market value of the securing property. 16 The United States
Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals decision and held that
the amount of an assumed nonrecourse mortgage is includable in
the amount realized from the sale regardless of whether the amount
of the mortgage exceeds the fair market value of the property
securing it. 17 Commissioner v. Tufts, 103 S.Ct. 1826 (1983).
The controversy surrounding the Tufts decision is the result of
footnote 37 of the United States Supreme Court opinion in Crane v.
Commissioner. 18 The Court in Crane held that when a taxpayer sells
property encumbered by a nonrecourse mortgage having a balance
less than the fair market value of the encumbered property, the
nonrecourse mortgage balance must be included in the amount
realized.' 9 The Crane Court was not required to determine what the
sale or other disposition of property is the sum of money received plus the fair market value of any
property received. I.R.C. § 1001(b) (West 1983).
11. Id. See I.R.C. § 1001(a) (West 1983). Section 1001(a) states that the gain or loss on the sale
or disposition of property is determined by subtracting the property's adjusted basis from the
amount realized. Id.
12. 103 S.Ct. at 1829. Although the individual partners did not claim their respective shares of
partnership loss on their individual tax returns, each did claim the loss in his petition to the Tax
Court. Id. at n.l.
13. Id. at 1829& n.2.
14. Id. The Commissioner computed the gain by subtracting the partnership's adjusted basis of
$1,455,740 from the mortgage balance of $1,851,500. Id. at n.2. The Commissioner characterized
the gain as capital gain pursuant to I.R.C. & 741. See I.R.C. § 741 (West 1983) (provides for
characterization of gain on sale of partnership interest).
15. Tufts v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 756, 770 (1978), rev'd, 651 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1981), rev'd,
103 S.Ct. 1826 (1983).
16. Tufts v. Commissioner, 651 F.2d 1058, 1063 (5th Cir. 1981).
17. 103 S.Ct. at 1834.
18. 331 U.S. 1 (1947). Mrs. Crane inherited an apartment building that her husband had
owned. Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 3 (1947). The building passed subject to a nonrecourse
mortgage, that was equivalent to the fair market value of the building. Id. Subsequently, Mrs. Crane
sold the building. The purchaser paid Mrs. Crane $3000 in cash and assumed the mortgage as
consideration for the sale. Id. The Commissioner contended that the amount Mrs. Crane realized on
the sale was not merely the cash received, but also the full amount of the assumed mortgage balance.
Id. at 3-5.
19. Id. at 14.
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tax consequences would be when the mortgage balance is greater
than the fair market value of the mortgaged property.
20
Nevertheless, the Court chose to address the issue in footnote 37 of
its opinion.2 The premise underlying footnote 37 is that because a
mortgagor is not personally liable on a nonrecourse loan, he cannot
realize a benefit equal to the assumed mortgage when the value of
the property is less than the mortgage balance. 22 In general, three
theories of the proper characterization and tax treatment of
transactions involving the sale of property subject to a nonrecourse
mortgage have developed as a result of footnote 37.23 Each theory
attempts to attribute a taxable benefit to the taxpayer in a different
manner.24
The economic benefit theory is frequently employed to
attribute a taxable benefit to a taxpayer.25 Under the economic
benefit theory, if a debt of a taxpayer is decreased or eliminated by
a third party, the taxpayer receives an economic benefit and,
therefore, realizes taxable income.2 6 Generally, the amount of
income the taxpayer realizes is the amount by which the debt is
decreased. 27  However, the applicability of this principle is
questionable when the fair market value of property sold subject to
a nonrecourse mortgage is less than the mortgage balance. 28 The
20. Note, supra note 2, at 1498. The author notes that the Crane Court did not explicitly reach
the issue of whether nonrecourse debt in excess of fair market value is includable in amount realized.
Id.
21. 331 U.S. at 14 n.37. Footnote 37 ofthe Cranedecision states:
Obviously, if the value of the property is less than the amount of mortgage, a
mortgagor who is not personally liable cannot realize a benefit equal to the mortgage.
Consequently, a different problem might be encountered where a mortgagor
abandoned the property or transferred it subject to the mortgage without receiving
boot. That is not this case.
Id.
22. Id. The Court in Crane noted that a discharge or reduction in personal debt results in income
to the taxpayer. Id. at 13 (citing United States v. Hendler, 303 U.S. 564 (1938)). Since the mortg2ge
in Crane was a nonrecourse mortgage, the mortgagor was not personally lable for its repayment.
Thus, the Court apparently believed its discharge could not attribute income to the taxpayer. See 331
U.S. at 14 n.37.
23. See Newman, The Resurgence of Footnote 37: Tufts v. Commissioner, 18 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1
(1982). The three theories arising from footnote 37 in Crane are the economic benefit theory, the tax
benefit theory, and the double deduction theory. See id.
24. Id.
25. See, e.g., Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929) (corporation's
payment of officers' income tax held to be an economic benefit to the officers); Millar v.
Commissioner, 577 F.2d 212 (3d Cir. 1978) (cancellation of taxpayer's $245,000 nonrecourse debt
held to be economic benefit to taxpayer), cert denied, 439 U.S. 1046 (1978).
26. See United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1 (1931) (a corporate taxpayer realizes
taxable gain when it retires outstanding debt at less than the original issue price).
27. Treas. Reg. S 1.61-12(a) (19 68). As an example, S 1.61-12 (a) states, "If... an individual
performs services for a creditor, who in consideration thereof cancels this debt, the debtor realizes
income in the amount of the debt." Id.
28. See Bittker, Tax Shelters, Nonrecourse Debt, and the Crane Case, 33 TAX L. REV. 277, 281 (1978).
Because a taxpayer is not personally liable on a nonrecourse loan, it is questionable whether in the
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question in this situation is whether the benefit received by the
seller can exceed the fair market value of the property sold.
29
In Millar v. Commissioner"0 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit applied the economic benefit theory.3' In
MiUar the taxpayers pledged stock as security for a $245,000
nonrecourse loan. 32  Subsequently, the nonrecourse loan was
satisfied by the surrender of the stock. 33 At the time of surrender
the stock had an adjusted basis of $39,492 - much less than the
mortgage balance. 34 Because the surrender of an asset with an
adjusted basis of $39,492 for the cancellation of a debt of $245,000
resulted in an economic benefit to the discharged party, the court
held that the taxpayer had realized a gain of $205,508.
35
One commentator has noted that because a taxpayer holding
property subject to a nonrecourse mortgage may abandon the
property without incurring personal liability, the mortgage
obligation is illusory. 36 Therefore, the discharge of a nonrecourse
obligation cannot support an economic benefit theory.3 7 Selling
property subject to a nonrecourse debt is analogous to selling
property subject to local property taxes.3 8 Like taxes, a nonrecourse
debt must be paid by the taxpayer to retain his property. 39 A person
event ofdischarge he can realize a personal benefit to the extent of a loan balance. Id. at 281.
29. Compare Rosenberg, Better to Burn Out Than to Fade Away?, Tax Consequences on the Disposition of
a Tax Shelter, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 87, 116 (1983) (the full amount of nonrecourse debt assumed by a
purchaser of mortgaged property should be included in the seller's amount realized) with Bittker,
supra note 28, at 281-82 (the amount realized from the sale of mortgaged property should not exceed
the fair market value of the property).
30. 577 F.2d 212 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 1046(1978).
31. Millar v. Commissioner, 577 F.2d 212, 213 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 1046 (1978).
The taxpayers in Millar contributed borrowed funds to a corporation, thereby increasing their bases
in their respective shares of stock. 577 F.2d at 213. The shareholders pledged their stock as security
for the borrowed funds. Id. See Treas. Reg. § 118-1 (1983) (contributions to a corporation are treated
by the shareholder as an additional price paid for the stock).
32. 577 F.2d at 213.
33. Id. The taxpayers in Millar executed nonrecourse demand notes that they subsequently
failed to pay. Id. At the time ofdefault the stock that secured the notes was worthless. Id.
34. Id. In Millar the shareholders elected to have the corporation taxed as a small business
corporation. Id. Accordingly, they claimed deductions and reduced their bases in their stock for
losses incurred by the corporation. Id. at 215. See I.R.C. §§ 1366(a) (1) (1) (allows shareholders to
deduct their pro rata share of losses of an "S" corporation); 1336(d) (1) (shareholders' bases in stock
of an "S" corporation are reduced, but not below zero, for deductions taken under § 1366(a)) (West
1983).
35. 577 F.2d at 215. The court in Millar noted that the loan enabled the taxpayers to increase
their bases in the stock and take sizable deductions against that basis. Id. The court reasoned,
therefore, that the taxpayers realized a taxable gain through tlie canctllatiui ofthe 1-.1t1 Id TO have
ruled otherwise would have allowed the taxpayers "the type of double deduction of which the
Supreme Court so clearly disapproved in Crane.'" Id.
:36. Bittker. supra, note 28. at 282. Professor Bittkc'r cotetnds t the Crane (otrt has
"ol,'verstated the reseiblance between nroecourse and personal obligations- ' Id. at 282.
37. Bittker, supra Note 28, at 284. The ctitii'nialor notes tdit -talxpayrs cannot bt''etli( b%
being 'relieved' of liabilities for which they are not liable. '" Id.
38. Bittker. supra note 28. at 282.
39. Bittker. supra note 28. at 282.
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who disposes of unprofitable property does not recognize an
economic benefit by being relieved of the burden to pay property
taxes in the future.40 Similarly, a person relieving himself of future
mortgage payments by transferring property subject to a
nonrecourse loan cannot realize an economic benefit.
41
This analogy has been attacked on the premise that the
obligation to pay future property taxes is dissimilar to the
obligation to repay a nonrecourse debt.4 2 Unlike relief from a
nonrecourse mortgage, relief from property taxes creates no
present enjoyment of the proceeds. 43 Therefore, it is not valid to
equate nonrecourse debt with future property taxes.
Another rationale that frequently is used to attribute a taxable
benefit to a taxpayer is the tax benefit theory. 44 When a taxpayer
receives loan proceeds, he does not realize income because it is
assumed that he will repay the loan at a future date. 45 Likewise, the
taxpayer may purchase depreciable property with the loan
proceeds, include the amount of the proceeds in the property's
basis, and take depreciation deductions against that basis without
realizing income from the proceeds. 46  However, if the loan
obligation is subsequently decreased or eliminated, tax
consequences will arise. 47 Should such an event occur, the tax
benefit theory requires the taxpayer to realize income because he
has received free tax benefits by taking depreciation deductions
against an amount he will not be required to repay.
48
The tax benefit theory raises the issue of whether the income
realized from the sale should be characterized as ordinary income
or capital gain. 49 The majority of decisions have elected to include
4(1. Bittker. supra note 28. at 282.
41. Bittker. supra note 28, at 282. The Court of Appeals hor the Fith Circuit in Tuts adopted
Professor Bittker's prolperty tax analogy, Tufts v. Commissioner, 651 F.2d 1158. 10(62 (Sth Cir.
1981).
42. See Newman, supra, note 23 at 12 (1982).
43. Newman. supra note 23 at 12. The commentator suggests treating the receipt of nonrclourse
loan pi IIeeds as a present allIUfl I realized, on it short sale theory, because tie loan proceeds are
!I)r -senI ly bei ng ( njoycd. Id. A "short sale" involves the sale of property that one may not vet own.
'lie transaction is not taxable until the property is delivered at the close of ht transaction. Id. ni.85.
44. See Millar v. Commissioner, 577 F.2d 212, 214-16 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1046
(1978). The Millar court noted that ifa taxpayer is not required to recognize gain from the discharge
of nonrecourse debt, he will be allowed a double tax benefit. 577 F.2d at 214-16. See Tufts v.
Commissioner, 70 T.C. 756, 765 (1978). The Tax Court in Tufts noted that a taxpayer selling
property subject to a nonrecourse mortgage may have enjoyed the tax benefits that accompany
depreciation deductions. Id.
45. Commissioner v. Tufts, 103 S.Ct. 1826, 1831 (1983).
46. Newman, Iupra note 23, at 2 u. 11.
47. See, e.g., United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1, 3 (1983) (redemption of corporate
bonds at less than issue price triggers gain to corporation).
48. See Rosenberg, supra note 29, at 95. When a taxpayer incurs a deductible expense and is
subsequently relieved from the obligation to pay the expense, he has offset his gross income with
expenses that he has not, in reality, incurred. Id.
49. See Rosenberg, supra note 29, at 95-113. Gain from the sale or exchange of a capital asset is
19841
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 60:153
the reduction or elimination amount in the taxpayer's amount
realized on the disposition of property.50 The result may be capital
gains treatment for the entire amount of income. 5 A contrary view
would include the entire reduction or elimination amount in the
taxpayer's gross income as income from a discharge of
indebtedness. 52 The result would be taxing the entire amount of
gain as ordinary income. 53 Treating the entire gain as ordinary
income may seem harsh when, arguably, it may have been derived
from the sale of property that may qualify for capital gain
treatment. 54 Conversely, treating the entire gain as capital gain
may seem to give the taxpayer a windfall when the depreciation
deductions exceed the amounts the seller has actually paid for the
property. 55
In an attempt to overcome these seemingly inherent defects,
an amicus curiae in Tufts suggested treating the reduction or
elimination of the nonrecourse mortgage and the disposition of the
property as separate transactions. 56 The sale transaction would
treat the fair market value of the property as the sale proceeds. 57 A
capital gain or loss figure would then be determined by subtracting
the cost basis from the sale proceeds. 58 Concerning the borrowing
capital gain. I.R.C. § 1222 (West 1983). See I.R.C. S 1221 for a definition ofcapital asset.
50. Rosenberg, supra note 29, at 95. See, e.g., Millar v. Commissioner, 577 F.2d 212, 214-16
(3d Cir. 1978) (amount of nonrecourse debt discharged in transfer of stock is includible in amount
realized on disposition); Tufts v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 756, 770 (1978) (amount of nonrecourse
debt assumed in sale of real property includable in amount realized).
51. See Tufts v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. at 770. The reduction or elimination amount is included
in amount realized on the sale of property and if the property is a capital asset or a § 1231 asset, any
gain is a capital gain. See Rosenberg, supra note 29, at 92-95. Section 1231 of the Internal Revenue
Code affords capital gain treatment to gains from the sale or exchange of property used in a
taxpayer's trade or business. I.R.C. 5 1231 (West 1983).
52. Rosenberg, supra note 29, at 113-14.
53. See I.R.C. § 61(a) (12) (West 1983). Section 61(a) (12) requires income from a discharge of
indebtedness to be included in gross income, and therefore taxed as ordinary income. Id.
54. See 103 S.Ct. at 1837 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor conceded that to reach
an equitable result, gains from the sale of encumbered property and the discharge of the debt should
receive separate treatment; the sale as capital gains and the discharge as ordinary income. Id.
55. See Rosenberg, supra note 29, at 99-100. Professor Rosenberg uses the following example to
illustrate the point: Taxpayer T buys depreciable real property for $400,000; T furnishes $20,000
cash and incurs a $380,000 nonrecourse mortgage. The property is sold by Twhile still subject to the
$380,000 mortgage. During his ownership, T has taken $100,000 of depreciation deductions.
Accordingly, T has offset ordinary income and reduced his basis by $100,000. Id. at 99. See I.R.C.
S 1016(a) (2)A (West 1983) (basis is reduced by deductions for depreciation). Twenty thousand
dollars of depreciation deductions are attributable to T's initial cash outlay. Eighty thousand dollars
of deductions are thus attributable to the mortgage and should be added back to ordinary income. To
include the $80,000 in amount realized would not accomplish this result. Rosenberg, supra, at 99.
The $80,000 would be taxed at capital gain rates and, thus, $48,000 would not be recovered. Id. at
100. See I.R.C. § 1202 (West 1983) (allows a deduction from gross income of 60% of net capital
gains).
56. Tufts, 103 S.Ct. at 1836 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor stated that she
would have adopted the separate transaction approach had the Court been "writing on a clean
slate.'' Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1837. Under the separate transaction approach, the sale proceeds will include the fair
market value of the property at the date of sale. Id.
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transaction, the taxpayer would realize ordinary income to the
extent the mortgage balance exceeds the fair market value of the
property surrendered. 59
Another commentator contends that an application of the
separate transaction theory to a case such as Tufts could result in no
net gain or loss on the disposition of the property. 60 Thus, there
would be no tax consequences from the disposition. 61 The
taxpayer, therefore, will have enjoyed substantial tax benefits
through previous depreciation deductions while suffering little or
no out-of-pocket loss.
62
Professor Rosenberg suggests a complex two-pronged analysis
that he contends would reach the correct result. 63 The first prong
determines the amount of gain the taxpayer must include in
ordinary income. 64 The amount of ordinary income would be the
portion of the unpaid cost basis that the taxpayer has deducted
through depreciation .
6
The second prong determines the amount of gain that will be
treated as long term capital gain. 66 That amount is the excess of the
property's fair market value over its adjusted basis at the date of the
sale. 67 Adjusted basis is original cost basis reduced by the amount
of depreciation deductions taken and the amount of the unpaid cost
basis not deducted as depreciation. 68 Professor Rosenberg contends
that this approach best reflects the benefits derived by the taxpayer
from taking deductions against an amount he will not be required
59. Id. The separate transaction approach would treat the excess of the mortgage balance over
the fair market value of secured property as a cancellation of indebtedness. Id. Income from the
cancellation ofindebtedness is ordinary income. I.R.C. § 61(a) (12) (West 1983).
60. See Rosenberg, supra note 29, at 105-06. Professor Rosenberg contends that the separate
transaction approach conceivably could allow the gain from the borrowing transaction to be offset by
a loss from the sale transaction. Id.
61. See Rosenberg, supra note 29, at 106.
62. Rosenberg, supra note 29, at 106.
63. Rosenberg, supra note 29, at 112. Professor Rosenberg concedes that his approach is
complex but notes that "the idea that equity should give way to simplicity has not been, and
hopefully will not become, one of the principles of our income tax system." Id.
64. Rosenberg, supra note 29, at 109.
65. Rosenberg, supra note 29, at 109. "Unpaid cost basis" is the excess of the mortgage balance
over the fair market value of the property. Id. If a taxpayer has depreciated 25% of the cost of a
property, and the nonrecourse mortgage balance of the property exceeds its fair market value by
$180,000, 25% of $180,000 would be the portion of "unpaid cost basis" that must be included in
gross income upon the sale of the property. Id. at 112.
66. Rosenberg, supra note 29, at 109.
67. Rosenberg, supra note 29, at 109. Professor Rosenberg would limit the amount of gain
subject to capital gain treatment to the excess of a property's fair market value over its adjusted basis.
This amount would be excluded from being treated as ordinary income. The remaining gain, the
amount of the mortgage in excess of fair market value, would be ordinary income to the extent that it
has been previously deducted as depreciation. Id.
68. Rosenberg, supra note 29, at 109. Professor Rosenberg offers the following example:
Taxpayer Thas property with an original cost of $400,000, $20,000 of which was paid and $380,000
of which was financed through a nonrecourse loan. T takes $100,000 of depreciation deductions
19841
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to repay.
6 9
The double deduction theory is the third theory used to
attribute a taxable benefit to a taxpayer. 70 The theory is based
on two premises. First, when loan proceeds are used to purchase
depreciable property, and the loan obligation is subsequently
reduced or eliminated, the taxpayer receives free tax benefits
through previous depreciation deductions. 7 1 Second, the failure to
include the nonrecourse debt in amount realized may allow the
mortgagor to claim a tax loss on the disposition of property when he
has suffered no corresponding economic loss. 72 The taxpayer
therefore would enjoy both depreciation deductions and a loss
deduction against a basis amount that he will not be required to
repay. 73 Both the Crane Court and the Millar court acknowledged
against the property. T then sells the property when its fair market value is $200,000. 'the sole
consideration for the sale is the assumption of the mortgage by the buyer. The amount and character
of income from the sale can be computed as follows:
Step 1:
Balance of nonrecourse mortgage assumed $380,000
Less fair market value of property at date of sale (200,000)
Unpaid cost basis $180,000
Percentage of cost basis deducted 25%
Portion of unpaid cost basis deducted previously as
depreciation and currently includible in ordinary
income $45,000
Step 2:
a) Unpaid cost basis $180,000
Less portion of unpaid cost basis deducted previously (45,000)
Unpaid cost not deducted $135,000
b) Original cost basis $400,000
Less depreciation taken (100,000)
Less unpaid cost basis not deducted (135,000)
Adjusted cost basis $165,000
c) Fair market value at date of sale $200,000
Less adjusted cost basis (165,000)
Capital gain $35,000
Thus, T would have income of $80,000 - $45,000 ordinary income and $35,000 capital gain.
Id. at 112.
69. See Rosenberg, supra note 29, at 109.
70. See Millar v. Commissioner, 577 F.2d 212, 215 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1046 (1978).
The Millar court relied on the double deduction theory. Id. See supra notes 30-35 for a discussion of
Millar.
71. Rosenberg, supra note 29, at 95.
72. Commissioner v. Tufts, 103 S.Ct. 1826, 1834 (1983). For example, if the partnership in
Tufts were not required to include the full amount of the nonrecourse loan in their amount realized
on the sale of the encumbered property, but rather were only required to include the fair market
value of the property, the partnership could have shown a $55,740 loss, adjusted basis of $1,455,740
over fair market value of $1,400,000, when the actual burden of the loss fell on the mortgagee. Id. at
1829.
73. See Rosenberg, supra note 29, at 95.
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the validity of the double deduction theory. 7 4
In Tufts v. Commissioner" the United States Supreme Court
held that the Crane rule applies when the nonrecourse mortgage
balance exceeds the fair market value of the property transferred.7 6
The amount the mortgage is reduced or eliminated will therefore be
included in amount realized.7 7 Any gain will be characterized as
gain on the disposition of property.
78
Although the Crane decision has been interpreted as ultimately
resting on the economic benefit theory, the tax benefit theory, and
the double deduction theory, 79 the Court refused to adopt any such
interpretation. 80 Rather, it interpreted Crane to rest on the broader
theory that a nonrecourse mortgage in this context may be treated
as a true loan. 81 The Court noted that although a similarity exists
between the tax benefit rule and the Crane rule, its analysis of Crane
focuses on the obligation to repay a loan and its subsequent
extinguishment. 82 The Court's analysis applies whether or not
deductions have been taken against the encumbered property.
83
The theory that the transaction should be treated as partly a
sale of property and partly a cancellation of indebtedness was noted
by the Court as a justifiable mode of analysis.84 However, under
this theory gain from the cancellation of indebtedness may qualify
for deferment under section 108 of the Internal Revenue Code
(Code).8 5 The Court declined to decide whether gain realized under
74. See Crane, 331 U.S. at 16; Millar, 577 F.2dat 215.
75. 103 S.Ct. 1826(1983).
76. Tufts, 103 S. Ct. at 1831. The Crane rule requires the full amount of the nonrecourse mort-
gage to be included in the amount realized on the sale of the property securing the mortgage
when the fair market value of the property is equal to or greater than the mortgage balance. 331 U.S.
at 11. See supra notes 18-24 and accompanying text for a discussion of Crane.
77. 103 S.Ct. at 1833 n.l. The Court's decision in Tufts is consistent with the treasury
regulations. Id. at 1837 (O'ConnorJ., concurring). See Treas. Reg. S 1.1001-2(b) (1982). Section
1.1001-2(b) provides that the amount received from a sale due to the assumption of nonrecourse
liability is not limited by the fair market value of the property sold. Id.
78. 103 S.Ct. at 1833 n.l 1.
79. See Millar v. Commissioner, 577 F.2d 212, 215 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1046 (1978)
(interpreting Crane as supporting the double deduction theory); Estate of Levine v. Commissioner,
634 F.2d 12, 17 (2d Cir. 1980) (interpreting Crane as resting on an economic benefit theory).
80. 103 S.Ct. at 1831.
81. Id. The effect of treating the nonrecourse loan as a true loan is to create a presumption that
persons borrowing on a nonrecourse basis will treat their indebtedness as a personal liability. Id. at
1832.
82. Id. at 1832 n.8.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1833 n.l 1. The Court noted that although the separate transaction theory may be
plausible, the Commissioner has not adopted it and no existing authority required the courts to
adopt it. Id.
85. Id. at 1837 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Section 108 of the Internal Revenue Code divides
the occurrence of cancellation of indebtedness into three categories: (1) that which occurs in
bankruptcy, (2) that which occurs when the taxpayer is insolvent, and (3) that which occurs when the
discharged debt is a qualified business indebtedness. See I.R.C. § 108(a) (1) (West 1983). In a
bankruptcy situation the benefit accruing from the discharge may be used to reduce certain tax
attributes of the taxpayer such as existing operating losses, credit carryovers, capital loss carryovers
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its approach would qualify for similar treatment.8 6 By not deciding
whether such a sale or disposition falls within the concept of
cancellation of indebtedness, the Court avoided deciding whether
its decision creates an exception to section 108 of the Code.
In disposing of Tufts' alternative argument that section 752 of
the Code provides a fair market value limitation on the amount
realized on the sale or disposition of partnership property, the
Court relied on the legislative history of section 752.87 Congress
intended the fair market value limitation language of section 75288
to apply only to transactions between a partner and a partnership. 9
That language was found to be inapplicable to a sale of a
partnership interest. 90 The Court found that the statute was
enacted to prevent partners from inflating their bases in the
partnership and not to provide special tax treatment for
partnerships. 9' Section 752 of the Code, therefore, was held to be
inapplicable to sales of partnership interests to third parties. 92
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Tufts v.
Commissioner, a taxpayer selling or disposing of property
encumbered by a nonrecourse mortgage will be required to include
the mortgage balance amount in amount realized. 93 The effect of
the Court's decision will be twofold. First, there will be some
confusion in the near future about which transactions still qualify
and basis in the taxpayer's business property. I.R.C. 5 108(b) (West 1983). When qualitied business
indebtedness is involved, the taxpayer may elect to reduce the basis of his depreciable property rather
than treating the benefit accuring from the discharge as income. I.R.C. § 108(c) (West 1983).
Qualified business indebtedness is any indebtedness incurred by a corporation or an individual in
connection with propertv used in his trade or business. I.R.C. § 108(d) (4) (West 1983). In all three
categories. incote froii the discharge will ultimately be realized when the tax attributes subject to
the reduced basis are sold, assuming tax attributes existed to be reduced. The time between the
discharge and the sale of the tax attributes is the deferment period. See I.R.C. § 108 (West 1983).
86. 103 S.Ct. at 1833 n. 11.
87. Id. at 1835.
88. I.R.C. § 752 (c) (West 1983). Section 752 provides, "For purposes of this section, a liability
to which property is subject shall, to the extent of the fair market value of such property, be
considered as a liability of the owner of the property." I.R.C. § 7 52(c) (West 1983).
89. 103 S.Ct. at 1836. See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A236, reprinted in 1954 U.S.
CODE Cost;. & AD. NEws 4017, 4377. The House Report states, "The transfer of property subject to
a liability by a partner to a partnership, or by the partnership to a partner, shall, to the extent of the
fair market value of such property, be considered a transfer of the amount of the liability along with
the property.'' Id.
90. 103 S.Ct. at 1836. 1.R.C. § 752(d) states, "In the case of a sale or exchange ofan interest in
a partnership, liabilities shall be treated in the same manner as liabilities in connection with the sale
or exchange of property not associated with partnerships." I.R.C. § 752(d) (West 1983). See also S.
REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A236, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4621,
5048. The Senate Report states, "When a partnership interest is sold or exchanged, the general rule
for the treatment of the sale or exchange of property subject to liabilities will be applied." Id.
91. 103 S.Ct. at 1836. The Court interpreted the legislative intent of § 752(c) to be the
prevention of a partner's selling property to the partnership for a price greatly in excess of its fair
market value and thereby taking tax deductions greatly in excess of the amount the partner is at risk.
Id.
92. Id.
93. 1d. at 1834.
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for deferment under section 108. Second, the decision could mean
excessive capital gains treatment for taxpayers disposing of
unprofitable property encumbered by a nonrecourse loan.
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